da betano casino： Sourav Ganguly’s suggestion for a best-of-three finals in one-daycompetitions betrays the depths to which his confidence levels haveplunged
Sankhya Krishnan12-Jul-2001Sourav Ganguly’s suggestion for a best-of-three finals in one-daycompetitions betrays the depths to which his confidence levels haveplunged. A final offers the most capable assessment of the mentaltoughness of a team and how they react under pressure, because thereis no second chance. The ability to raise one’s game to suit theoccasion and peak at just the right time, is an essential ingredientof a good team. Ganguly’s remarks are a telltale sign that he knowsthe team is simply not good enough at the crunch. Rather then doinghis damnedest to resolve the problem, he’s suggesting means toavoid dealing with it. “We have to learn to win under pressure” headmitted immediately after the final, but that can be done only byplaying when the pressure is the maximum, not by diffusing it acrossthree matches.The defeat at the Harare Sports Club last Saturday was India’s seventhloss in a row in a tournament final. It all began with the Pepsi Cupagainst Pakistan at Bangalore in April 1999. The Indian bowlers letthe game slip away in the first session by allowing Pakistan to hoist291. Any hopes of making a match of it hinged on getting a decentstart but when the Indian top order collapsed to 63/5, there was noescape route. Against the same opponents in the Coca-Cola Cup inSharjah less than two weeks later, India won a useful toss but losttwo wickets in the first over without a run on board and were rolledover for 125 to gift the match on a platter.In the Coca-Cola Cup in Singapore in September the same year, Indiaposted a challenging 254 despite losing Tendulkar for a duck in thefirst over. The bowlers had West Indies on the mat at 67/4 and later128/5 but were clueless in the face of a ferocious assault by RicardoPowell. Precisely one month later India entered the LG Cup final inNairobi having swept all their matches in the round-robin league.After restricting South Africa to just 235, the batsmen fumbled agreat opportunity to succumb by 26 runs with two and a half overs leftunused.The next episode in the gloomy sequence also occurred at Nairobi’sGymkhana Club Ground in October 2000. It was the climax of the ICCKnockOut and India were delighted to be inserted after losing thetoss. Ganguly and Tendulkar added 141 for the opening wicket but themiddle order lost its way. Still, 264 was a competitive score and whenNew Zealand slumped to 132/5, the signs were propitious. A crucialrun-out miss relieved Chris Cairns who proceeded to shut India outwith a marvellously paced effort. Later in the same month, a 245-runthumping ensued at Sri Lanka’s hands in the Champions Trophy inSharjah, a collective abdication of duty of monstrous proportion.Looking at the pattern, India have conceded 290 or more on three offour occasions they’ve bowled first which puts the batsmen underenormous pressure rightaway. To have a ghost of chance, the cardinalrule is to keep wickets in hand even at the risk of falling behind theasking rate early on. But the top order has usually tried to do toomuch too soon, with negative results. This was exemplified againsta West Indies attack last week having just three specialist bowlers.The Indians had a gilt-edged chance to step up the ante in 20remaining overs of part time spin bowling but Sodhi and Dighe wereleft high and dry and just failed to close it on their own.Batting first, India erected the foundations of victory with 250 plusscores two out of three times. In each instance, they quickly prisedout the opponent’s upper half but threw it away in the last 25 overswith a combination of loose bowling, lax fielding and unimaginativecaptaincy. It’s been suggested that one reason the Indians freeze inlive match situations is because they don’t simulate situations ofcomparable pressure in the nets. But more alarmingly the Indians seemto be using defeat as a stepping stone for further defeat. Perhapsthey ought to take a leaf out of author Richard Bach: “That’s whatlearning is, after all; not whether we lose the game, but how we loseand how we’ve changed because of it and what we take away from it thatwe never had before, to apply to other games. Losing, in a curiousway, is winning.”